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Introduction: The Actor as „Double-Agent‟ 
[F]or the first time, through the other body, I see that, in its coupling with the flesh of the 
world, the body contributes more than it receives, adding to the world that I see the 
treasure necessary for what the other body sees. For the first time, the body no longer 
couples itself up with the world, it clasps another body, applying itself to it carefully with 
its whole extension, forming tirelessly with its hands the strange statue which in its turn 
gives everything it receives; the body is lost outside of the world and its goals, fascinated 
by the unique occupation of floating in Being with another life, of making itself the 
outside of its inside and the inside of its outside. And henceforth movement, touch, 
vision, applying themselves to the other and to themselves, return toward their source 
and, in the patient and silent labor of desire, begin the paradox of expression. 
 
- Maurice Mearleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible 
 
In one of his last writings before his death in 1961, French phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty makes the case that the individual‘s flesh is the vanishing point of the distinction 
between subject and object, self and other, and the individual and the world. He argues that to 
look at oneself through the eyes of another necessarily blends the divide between one body and 
another and, by applying one‘s senses to another‘s, one engages in a ―paradox of expression,‖ or 
a double-agency between both oneself and another. I borrow Merleau-Ponty‘s phrase as my title 
because it is particularly apt regarding a technique German playwright, director, theorist, and co-
founder of the Berliner Ensemble Bertolt Brecht called the Verfremdungseffekt
1
. The 
Verfremdungseffekt is a technique for creating a sense of ‗defamiliarization‘ in the spectator‘s 
consideration of a character. In A ‘Paradox of Expression’, I try to come to terms with Brecht‘s 
challenging theories as they function in practice. I use Merleau-Ponty‘s ―paradox of expression‖ 
as a way of considering Brecht‘s call for the co-presence of the actor and their character in a 
stage performance. To better understand Merleau-Ponty‘s position, I borrow sociologist Nick 
Crossley‘s approach to phenomenological intersubjectivity and consider the apparent theoretical 
                                                 
1
 Translated literally: prefix ver=strong; adjective fremd=foreign; noun Effekt=effect. Because of the historically 
contested nature of its English translation, I prefer the German noun/adjective Verfremdungseffekt in place of 
‗defamiliarization‘, ‗alienation‘, ‗estrangement‘, ‗distanciation‘, or any other confusing English variant. 
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implications in the performance of the Verfremdungseffekt. In this thesis I argue that in order for 
the actor to successfully perform Brecht‘s Verfremdungseffekt in performance, the actor must 
play into their character while occasionally playing out of the character – using what I call the 
‗reflective block‘ – in an alternative attitude so the spectator will notice their comment on their 
character. 
For Brecht, the Verfremdungseffekt was a technique for creating a sense of 
‗defamiliarization‘ in the spectator‘s consideration of a character. Brecht warns against 
improvisatory, impulsive activities that lead the actor astray from an informed, critical creation 
of character. In his 1938 essay The Street Scene
2
, Brecht defines the central aims of the 
Verfremdungseffekt:  
What is involved here is, briefly, a technique of taking the human social incidents to be 
portrayed and labeling them as something striking, something that calls for explanation, 
is not to be taken for granted, not just natural. The object of the ‗effect‘ is to allow the 
spectator to criticize from a social point of view (BT 125). 
 
Brecht argues that the actor must not only perform the choices he or she is making as the 
character, but that the actor must consciously show that he or she is making those choices, and 
also show the choices he or she is not making. ―The aim of this technique was to make the 
spectator adopt an attitude of inquiry and criticism in his approach to the incident…[t]he actor 
must invest what he has to show‖ (BT 136) Brecht writes, arguing that the actor‘s intent and 
opinion is as important as their portrayal of the character‘s psychophysical experience. The actor 
is not the character, he insists, but merely does the best he can to reproduce their remarks and 
feelings about their situation, but never tries to persuade himself of any complete transformation. 
I will argue, however, that this critical reproduction cannot exist as a seamless, simultaneous 
series of actions, but rather as an interconnected double helix: first performing toward a complete 
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 Nearly all of my references to Brecht‘s essays are taken from Brecht on Theatre, an anthology of Brecht‘s 
theoretical writings edited by John Willett, heretofore BT. 
 3 
transformation, and then stepping out of the character‘s psychophysical experience and showing 
the character performing a contradictory act – something they would not do. The actor is self-
conscious, reflective, and aware of the distinction between himself and his character.  
When the actor makes this break from transformation, the existing pre-reflective 
engagement with the character does not simply go away; rather, it is, as I will argue, an inherent 
part of acting that the actor take the world around them and the character‘s given circumstances 
for granted. In an evaluation of a performance by Chinese actors that Brecht witnessed in 
Moscow in 1935, he describes for the first time what he would later call Verfremden, or 
‗distancing effects‘: ―[t]he performer‘s self-observation, an artful and artistic act of self-
alienation, stopped the spectator from losing himself in the character completely, i.e. to the point 
of giving up his own identity, and lent a splendid remoteness to the events‖ (BT 93). Upon 
witnessing this different style of acting, Brecht went on to search for the ways in which he could 
train actors to produce a similar effect in their performances. By picking up Brecht‘s line, I too 
have explored the process of working with actors to produce Verfremden in their acting in my 
2012 practice-based research project The Galileo Experiment. Brecht was not suggesting a 
completely new ‗type‘ or ‗form‘ of acting. He was arguing for a kind of double-agency: a 
perception of character that leaves room for the presence of the actor whose consciousness and 
opinions surface, disappear, and reappear throughout the performance.  
During a 1981 seminar in London, Ekkehard Schall, one of the Berliner Ensemble‘s 
veteran actors said, ―[b]asically, the Verfremdungseffekt is really just the representation of a 
contradiction, a contradiction in society, a contradiction between subjectivity and the assumption 
of a final, real stance [Verhalten] towards reality…Verfremdung is simple‖ (65). Brecht‘s 
theoretical essays on acting and Schall‘s off-the-cuff remark form the basis for my exploration of 
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Brecht‘s Verfremdungseffekt in performance. Having interrogated so-called ―Brechtian‖ 
techniques on the page, in the rehearsal studio, in the classroom, and before audiences in various 
contexts for the better part of the past decade, I have begun to understand the simplicity of 
Brecht‘s ideas about acting to which Schall alludes. In A ‘Paradox of Expression’ I synthesize 
some of my prevailing questions and concerns about Brecht‘s theory in practice and consider the 
ways in which Verfremdung can be thought and talked about, but most importantly, the ways in 
which contemporary actors can successfully perform the Verfremdungseffekt when called on to 
do so. I navigate this terrain by mapping a practical research project titled The Galileo 
Experiment, in which I staged four scenes
3
 from Brecht‘s Life of Galileo and investigated, in 
practical terms, the very questions I ask in this thesis.  
In his essay A Short Description for a New Technique of Acting Which Produces an 
Alienation Effect, first written as a prefatory note in 1940, Brecht states that the aim of the 
Verfremdungseffekt was to instill in the spectator a stance or attitude of critical inquiry toward 
the characters rather than empathetic understanding (BT 136). There are many techniques for 
creating distancing (verfremden) effects in the theatre that are achieved with music, technical, 
staging, and design choices. Brecht writes, ―[t]he A-effect was achieved in the German epic 
theatre not only by the actor, but also by the music (chorus, songs) and the setting (placards, film 
etc.)‖ (BT 96). Brecht used music in his productions internally as numbers sung by the actors that 
progressed the plot and established relationships (much like and influenced by the modern 
American musical); but he also employed music externally, outside the action of the play, as 
scene headings or short poems sung at the beginnings of scenes to foreshadow the coming action. 
For example, in Life of Galileo, someone sings a couplet before the third scene: ―In the year 
                                                 
3
 Specifically, scenes 1, 10, 13 and 14 based on a combination of the 1937-9 version translated by John Willett, and 
the shorter 1947 version translated by Charles Laughton. 
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sixteen hundred and nine / Science‘s light began to shine. / At Padua City in a modest house / 
Galileo Galilei set out to prove / The sun is still, the earth is on the move‖ (see appx. A, Section 
1 and appx. D). Whether it was used internally or externally, Brecht encouraged his composers to 
write musical scores with moods that contradicted the libretti in some way. When working with 
Emily Larson, who composed original scores for the four couplets that open each of the sections 
in The Galileo Experiment, we explored using atonal and various other jarring musical effects to 
help contradict the text. To a similar end, Brecht was famous for projecting foreshadowing 
placards or captions that announced the coming action. For example, in the same scene, Brecht 
includes a caption at the beginning of the scene in his text: ―Galileo Galilei, a teacher of 
mathematics at Padua, sets out to prove Copernicus‘s new cosmogony‖ (5). These techniques – 
among the use of half-curtains that did not completely conceal scene changes, masks, doing 
away with stage masking, and other effects that exposed the makings of theatrical production – 
were also intended to remind the spectator of the illusion and aid them in making a conscious 
critical reflection on the play from a social point of view.  
In this thesis, however, I will remain focused solely on the actor‘s role in creating this 
effect. Schall asserts that although other stage devices can aid in creating Verfremdungseffekte, 
―the best means of Verfremdung remain those which pull the contradiction out of a 
performance‘s unity‖ (65-66). Discovering and citing the central contradictions of the text is a 
major step in the process of performing the Verfremdungseffekt. After all, as Brecht argued, these 
techniques were ―principally designed to historicize the incidents portrayed‖ (BT 96). In a move 
against the popular bourgeois theatre (Brecht mostly refers to Romantic theatre, but also German 
Expressionism) Brecht wanted to avoid telling the story of the ‗Universal Man‘: that which sees 
man not as a product of his time and society, but as someone with whom every audience member 
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can relate. By historicizing the incidents – whether during the Spanish Inquisition (Life of 
Galileo) or the Thirty Years‘ War (Mother Courage and Her Children) – the everyday event 
(such as a young woman leaving home to find work) becomes significant. He writes,  
The theatre concentrates entirely on whatever in this perfectly everyday event is 
remarkable, particular and demanding enquiry. What! A family letting one of its 
members leave the nest to earn her future living independently and without help? Is she 
up to it? (BT 97) 
 
By questioning the normality of the seemingly everyday event, Brecht is arguing for an 
uncovering of what might actually be remarkable or contradictory about the event and the people 
it affects. Pulling the contradiction out of a performance is at the heart of the thesis of A 
‘Paradox of Expression’. As I will show in Chapter 2, the ‗reflective block‘ is the moment of 
showing the remarkable in the everyday.  
In all of Brecht‘s plays and theory, the ultimate goal of his theatre was to highlight the 
dangers and hypocrisies of oppressive regimes. The Verfremdungseffekt is something Brecht 
employed in order to ―alert attention to contradictory behavior that is the symptom of an 
oppressive society in need of change‖ (Mumford, BB 116). By highlighting the inherent 
contradictory behavior of the characters themselves, the actors point to the contradictory 
behavior of the leaders of an oppressive social structure as well as the behaviors of individuals 
complicit in the regime‘s power structure.  
The many reasons for and meanings behind why Brecht believed that an actor should 
show two or more sides of a character have already been exhaustively explored in the other 
studies and analyses (see Fuegi 1987; Mumford 1997; Carney 2012; Glahn 2014; Unwin 2014; 
Brecht, Silberman, Giles & Kuhn 2015, and many more). Brecht did not invent the 
Verfremdungseffekt. He owes the concept, at least in part, to his friend and contemporary 
Russian literary critic and novelist Victor Shklovsky, who coined the term ostranenie 
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[остранение] many years before Brecht‘s first mention of Verfremdungseffekt. For Shklovsky, 
writing in 1916, ostranenie, or ‗defamiliarization‘ was a general philosophy of art:  
The purpose…of art is to make objects ‗unfamiliar,‘ to make forms difficult, to increase 
the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic 
end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an 
object; the object is not important (12). 
 
Shklovsky‘s ostranenie concept was intended to make the spectator think about art objects less 
as objects of meaning, but rather as interpretable phenomena in and of themselves. A simple 
object, therefore, becomes something to be reconsidered and reinterpreted, therefore making the 
spectator criticize and respond to the artwork.  
For Brecht, however, the first step to achieving this condition in acting is for the actor to 
―invest what he has to show with a definite gest of showing‖ (BT 136). The word ‗show‘ 
[aufzeigen] is a key to understanding what Brecht wanted when he asked actors to produce an 
‗alienating‘ effect in their performances. He wanted the actor to not only perform the role of the 
character, but to be dexterous enough to show the audience that he is showing them an 
alternative action to that action which the character actually performs in the play. To further his 
illustration, Brecht also addresses what he calls the procedure of ―fixing the ‗not…but‘.‖ This 
idea was central to my query when entering the first rehearsals for The Galileo Experiment. What 
does it look like, I wondered, for an actor to imagine his character behaving in one attitude, but 
instead perform in an alternative attitude?  
When he appears on the stage, besides what he is actually doing he will at all essential 
points discover, specify, imply what he is not doing; that is to say he will act in such a 
way that the alternative emerges as clearly as possible, that his acting allows the other 
possibilities to be inferred and only represents one out of the possible variants … 
Whatever he doesn‘t do must be contained and conserved in what he does. In this way 
every sentence and every gesture signifies a decision; the character remains under 
observation and is tested. The technical term for this procedure is ‗fixing the ―not…but‖‘ 
(BT 137). 
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Performing the ‗not…but‘ procedure is the performance process at the heart of my thesis and 
will remain the central example of the Verfremdungseffekt in acting. Going into rehearsals for 
The Galileo Experiment, I asked: how does the actor imagine his character behaving in one 
attitude, but instead perform in an alternative attitude all the while implying what he is not doing, 
so the spectator will notice the actor's comment on their character?  
 In October through December 2012, I staged four scenes of Brecht‘s Life of Galileo in the  
 
Masquer Theatre, a 200-seat black-box space on the University of Montana campus. I pared the 
script (see appx. A) down to nineteen pages and eight characters. I worked with five actors, a 
stage manager, a costume designer, a composer, and a vocalist. We rehearsed for up to four 
hours at time, three to five nights per week over six weeks. A public audience of about eighty 
people witnessed the performance on December 10, 2012. The actors performed in a twenty-foot 
diameter white chalk circle drawn on the black stage floor. Chairs were arranged around the 
circle leaving four aisles for entrances and exits (fig. 1). The pianist played at an upright piano 
set at the end of one aisle just outside the circle. Galileo‘s table sat in the center of the circle for 
Fig. 2. A handmade telescope by Carl Ambrose Fig. 1. The Galileo Experiment ground plan 
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scenes one and four. In Section 1, Galileo (G. Stephen Hodgson) entered through an aisle past 
the audience, paused, stepped over the chalk line, entered the circle, sat at the table, and slowly 
donned Galileo‘s physicality (see appx. C, Video 2). Scene ten (our Section 2) of Life of Galileo 
is a large street festival scene in which a ballad-singer and his wife tell the people the story of 
Galileo‘s findings and the implications they have on the existence of God (see appx. A, Section 
2). I staged this scene in the empty circle with only one vocalist singing with piano 
accompaniment. A large wooden telescope (fig. 2) stood at one outside edge of the circle. During 
the song, the vocalist crouched at the telescope and panned it around the circle, scanning the 
audience. In scene thirteen (our Section 3), the characters waited on a bare stage in anticipation 
to hear whether Galileo has recanted his teachings during his interrogation by officers of the 
Inquisition. Despite the risk that he may be tortured or even martyred, Galileo‘s pupil Andrea 
(Colton Swibold) and his assistant Federzoni (Hugh Bickley) hope he will not deny the truth of 
their findings, while his daughter Virginia (Katie Norcross) sits and prays that he will recant so 
that he can still be saved. In our version, Virginia knelt in the center of the circle, praying silently 
and rhythmically rocking back and forth, while the two men circled her, condemning her faith. In 
general, the staging within the circle included varying orbital patterns, making a direct comment 
on the heart of the debate between Galileo and the church about the centrality of the universe. In 
both of the following chapters, I explore more specific staging and acting choices the actors and I 
made together in rehearsal in an attempt to dissect Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure. A ‘Paradox of 
Expression’ seeks not only to investigate the practical applications of the Verfremdungseffekt in 
acting, but also to interrogate some of the theoretical implications of such a process.  
In Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming (1996), Nick Crossley defines two 
contrasting phenomenological perspectives on intersubjective relationships: egological 
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intersubjectivity and radical intersubjectivity. Deriving from a reading of Edmund Husserl‘s 
Cartesian Meditations (1931), Crossley articulates that egological intersubjectivity ―involves an 
empathic intentionality which experiences otherness by way of an imaginative transposition of 
self into the position of the other" (23). In this mode, the self intellectually distinguishes self 
from other and subject from object in order to assess their own position in relation to the world 
and others. In a reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty‘s Phenomenology of Perception (1945), 
Crossley clearly illustrates the departure Merleau-Ponty took from Husserl‘s assertion that 
(egological) intersubjectivity is reflective, self-aware, and experiential. Crossley suggests that 
radical intersubjectivity, in contrast, ―involves a lack of self awareness and a communicative 
openness toward the other, which is unconditional. Self engages with other in this modality but 
has no experience of them as such" (23). In this modality, Merleau-Ponty is not arguing for an a 
posteriori demonstration of the facts, but rather a simple acceptance that the world is merely 
available to the subject to be lived in – reflectively or otherwise.  
A ‘Paradox of Expression’ does not intend to argue or imply that the actor engages in an 
intersubjective relationship with their character. That would be theoretically impossible to argue 
due to the facts that 1) the actor and character share a physical body, and 2) because the character 
is itself a conceptual construct of the actor‘s conscious mind. I do, however, argue that 
Crossley‘s two modes of phenomenological intersubjectivity are useful illustrations of the two 
modes in which the actor must relate with their character in order to perform the ‗not…but‘ 
procedure. I argue that the actor can build a character, eventually develop the ability to allow the 
character to work through them in a pre-reflective manner, and then consciously perform the 
‗reflective block‘ and play out of the character in an alternative attitude so the spectator will 
notice their comment on their character. I distinguish two modes (radical and egological) of the 
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actor‘s perception and experience of their character and argue that one is more immediate than 
the other. By breaking away from the radical mode in which the actor‘s perception of their 
character is eventually pre-reflective, and considering an egological mode in which the actor‘s 
perception of their character is conscious and reflective, I am not arguing for a division of actor 
into subject and character into object. On the contrary, I maintain that phenomenological 
intersubjectivity – be it the radical or egological mode – is an ongoing, fluid process of uniting 
subject and object, actor and character. 
Throughout this thesis, I make reference to ‗the body‘: the body of the actor and their 
character, the building up of characters‘ bodies, sensible and sentient expressions of the body, 
and the like. A clarification is in order: in the context of this work, by no means does ―body‖ 
only refer to the physical body. I am following the argument of neuroscientists, biologists, 
cognitive philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and others who now believe the body, 
nervous system, and mind/brain to be fully interconnected. The mind/body dualism of Descartes 
has long been rejected and the time has come when scholars of many disciplines are and ought to 
be able to assume that the word ―body‖ or ―bodily‖ includes mental, spiritual, emotional, 
somatic, interpersonal, and expressive aspects of the human experience. There is a retinue of 
resources in the cognitive sciences and philosophy working under the premise of enactive or 
embodied cognition (Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Damasio 2000; Iacoboni 2008; Johnson 2008, to 
name a few), and many theatre and performance scholars have argued for various iterations of 
cognitive embodiment in performance under the same assumption (Blair 2008, McConachie 
2008, Lutterbie 2011, Kemp 2012, Zarrilli 2008, Zarrilli, et al. 2013). 
The following two chapters mirror one another in structure. ―Chapter 1. Towards a 
Phenomenology of ‗Brechtian Acting‘,‖ begins with ―1.1. Radical Intersubjectivity,‖ in which I 
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explain how I am taking Crossley‘s approach to radical intersubjective relation and adapting and 
applying it to the actor‘s process in performing the first step in the ‗not…but‘ procedure. I 
compare Lee Strasberg‘s Affective Memory acting technique as developed via students of 
Konstantin Stanislavski‘s Emotion Memory technique to radical intersubjectivity and argue that 
the actor must first be able to perform their character in a pre-reflective mode before being able 
to step away and perform the complete ‗not…but‘ procedure. In an effort to further illustrate my 
original approach to Crossley‘s theory, ―1.2. Building the Characters in The Galileo 
Experiment,‖ documents the actors‘ work developing physical bearings, or ‗comportments‘, for 
their characters in The Galileo Experiment. ―1.3. The Actor/Character Dialectic,‖ is an attempt to 
synthesize the previous two sections and explore the theoretical implications of the practical 
applications of Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure. I argue for Merleau-Ponty‘s later writings on 
intersubjectivity as a non-reductive mode of investigation, which considers the fluid, ongoing, 
interactional dialectic of the actor/character relationship. In Chapter 1, I ultimately argue for a 
phenomenological reading of the Verfremdungseffekt. 
―Chapter 2. Performing the ‗Reflective Block‘,‖ begins with ―2.1. Egological 
Intersubjectivity,‖ in which I make a case that aligns Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure with 
Crossley‘s description of the egological mode of intersubjectivity. In ―2.2. Performing the 
‗not…but‘ Procedure in The Galileo Experiment,‖ I describe our process in The Galileo 
Experiment where the actors chose moments in the text to exit their characters‘ comportments 
and perform in an alternative attitude. In ―2.3. Crossley‘s ‗reflective block‘ and Brecht‘s 
‗not…but‘,‖ I argue that the moment of switching over from the radical to the egological mode is 
the very act of ―fixing the ‗not…but‘‖ that Brecht describes. For this section, I borrow ‗reflective 
block‘, a phrase from Crossley that signifies the point at which a person steps out of a pre-
 13 
reflective engagement with the world and others and considers and assesses their stance and 
perspective. To be clear, Crossley‘s book does not use any theatrical or performative imagery, 
analogies, or metaphors to illustrate his points; the arguments about intersubjectivity and 
Brecht‘s techniques are my own.  
Ultimately, this thesis takes the approach of two articulations of phenomenological 
intersubjectivity between self and other. In my analysis of the relationship between an actor and 
their character, I borrow the traits of each mode of intersubjectivity to explore how Brecht‘s 
writings on Verfremdungseffekte in acting are a dialectical discussion between two differing 
phenomenological perspectives on the world and self/other relations. In the conclusion, I 
reiterate the argument that both modes of intersubjective perception and relation between actor 
and character exist co-presently, and that the ‗not…but‘ procedure is simply a moment of 
reflective clarity in which the actor steps beyond their character and takes stock of their present 
experience. I return to Merleau-Ponty and argue that the sensible and the sentient aspects of 
experience are neither mutually exclusive nor one and the same. I conclude that both radical and 
egological intersubjectivity are, in fact, reliant upon one another. In order to perform the 
‗not…but‘ procedure, I argue that the actor must break away from the radical mode in which the 
actor‘s perception of their character is pre-reflective, and consciously sense the character – which 
shares a body with and was conceived by the actor – in the egological mode. I argue that 
performing the ‗not…but‘ procedure is an ongoing, fluid process uniting actor and character as a 
sensible-sentient being that is highlighting contradictory aspects of its shared sets of behaviors. 
To ―contain and conserve,‖ what he does not do in what he does, I conclude, the actor must 
perform in both the radical and egological modes of intersubjectivity. 
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Chapter 1. Towards a Phenomenology of “Brechtian Acting” 
In the introduction, I stated my central claim that the actor can successfully perform the 
‗not…but‘ procedure by performing in both of Crossely‘s two modes of intersubjectivity: radical 
and egological. The following chapter asks what it means for an actor to perform two attitudes: 
that of the character as written in the script and that of the character‘s potential alternative 
attitude, which produces a Verfremdungseffekt. In this chapter, I begin by outlining a basic 
understanding of Crossley‘s reading of Merleau-Ponty‘s writings on intersubjectivity. I also 
include a discussion in which I compare Konstantin Stanislavski‘s Emotion Memory and Lee 
Strasberg‘s Affective Memory to Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure as an illustration of radical 
intersubjectivity. In an effort to further illustrate the use of this theoretical lens, I describe our 
process in The Galileo Experiment where we took a physical approach to building a character 
and finding a way into a character‘s psychophysical experience. In the final section, I explore the 
dialectical relationships between actor and character by arguing that Merleau-Ponty‘s 
phenomenology posited a pre-reflective, ongoing, interactional relationship between subject and 
object. Using the later writings of Merleau-Ponty, I illustrate my point that as a theoretical tool, 
phenomenology does not necessarily divide the subject and object, but rather functions as a 
useful way of looking at the deeply interconnected and interdependent nature of the 
actor/character relationship. 
 
1.1. Radical Intersubjectivity 
In order for the actor to show an alternative, unexpected attitude of the character, the 
actor must first build a character and play into the character until they can perform their character 
in a pre-reflective manner. This kind of intuitive, instinct-driven performance of character 
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requires actors to open themselves to all available influences in the world around them. Human 
subjectivity is not a private affair. In order to have a basic understanding of their ontology, 
individuals must engage with the world and others in order to be reflected back onto their 
consciousness. In the radical mode of intersubjectivity, human consciousness itself is simply an 
opening onto otherness. Throughout the second chapter of Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social 
Becoming, ―Subjectivity, Alterity and Between: On Radical Intersubjectivity,‖ Crossley argues 
that for Merleau-Ponty, the self is 1) unaware, 2) communicates with and responds to others on 
the basis of their perceivable actions, and 3) that perception is pre-reflective. Because the actor 
has a body that they have created for their character, they are in constant sensuous, embodied 
engagement with the character. To be clear, however, the character is, of course, a conceptual 
construct of the actor‘s conscious mind; therefore, the character has no autonomous agency as 
such because whatever the character does, the actor does as well. ―Radical intersubjectivity,‖ 
Crossley writes, can be conceptualized as ―an irreducible interworld of shared meanings‖ (24). In 
other words, whatever phenomena (objects, landscapes, animals, other humans, etc.) are 
available to the individual as a sensing being are available to be engaged with and given 
significance. Whatever the means of engagement – be it vision, touch, taste, hearing, or olfactory 
– the intersubjective connection is sub-conscious. Adapting this understanding of perception, I 
argue that like the subject‘s pre-reflective experience of the world and others, the actor‘s 
perception of their character is public and therefore intersubjective.  
The radical mode of intersubjectivity is an a priori given state that, as individuals in the 
world, we take for granted. Actors, however, have to tease apart their pre-reflective perceptions 
of the world and others. Actors must uncover the constituent parts of their understanding of the 
imaginary world around them. This means that in the radical mode, the actor consciously defines 
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what the character takes for granted, and then forgets about it. For example, as you read these 
words on the page, you are largely unaware of the shapes of the letters, the contrast of black lines 
on a white background, and the patterns of groupings of images spaced out in linear sequences. 
Rather, your experience is framed by the context of the activity in which you are engaged: 
reading words and sentences which, when strung together make meaning. This contextual 
framing, Crossley illustrates, is a ―dialectical movement between perception and action; action 
frames perception whilst perception calls forth action‖ (28). As I will illustrate, the actor is in a 
constant flux between making acting choices based on their perception of the fictional world they 
inhabit and reacting to their perceptions of the action occurring onstage around them. In order to 
frame the following section, I point to one example of another historical legacy of acting 
methodologies that were born on either side of Brecht‘s career.  
Russian actor, director, and founder of the Moscow Art Theatre, Konstantin Stanislavski 
developed a ‗System‘ that included a technique that he called ‗Emotion Memory‘. In An Actor’s 
Work
4
 (1936), Stanislavsky describes Emotion Memory: 
Just as your visual memory resurrects long forgotten things, a landscape or the image of a 
person, before your inner eye, so feelings you once experienced are resurrected in your 
Emotion Memory. You thought they were completely forgotten but suddenly a hint, a 
thought, a familiar shape, and once again you are in the grip of past feelings, which are 
sometimes weaker than the first time, sometimes stronger, sometimes in the same or 
slightly modified form. Once you can blench or blush simply by recalling something that 
happened to you, once you are afraid to think about a past misfortune, you have a 
memory for feelings, or Emotion Memory (199). 
 
Stankislavski goes on to describe using not only old memories to create physically manifested 
emotional responses, but the necessity of using the senses to conjure the memories themselves. 
He concludes: ―You can see clearly…the tight relationship and interaction of our five senses and 
                                                 
4
 These writings were originally published in English by Theatre Arts, Inc. as two separate volumes, An Actor 
Prepares and Building a Character, both translated by Elizabeth Hapgood. An Actor’s Work is a 2010 compilation 
of the two works and other writings translated and edited by Jean Benedetti. 
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their influence on the things which Emotion Memory recalls‖ (203). The ultimate goal behind 
Emotion Memory is to have a tool that allows the actor to repeat real life emotions onstage as if 
the character were experiencing them for the first time, giving the actor a tool that can help bring 
them closer to a total immersion in the role. Emotion Memory is an illustration of acting in the 
radical mode of intersubjectivity. However, Stanislavski warns the actor of going too far with 
this exercise and the potential psychological dangers it presents. In fact, in his later writings on 
what he called The Method of Physical Action, in which the actor uses physical stimuli to 
conjure up emotional responses, Stanislavski encouraged actors to preference this process for the 
sake of protecting their own psychological wellbeing against the latent dangers inherent in 
Emotion Memory exercises. However, it was the technique of Emotion Memory that struck a 
chord with American actors and teachers in the mid-1920s.  
In 1931, Harold Clurman, Lee Strasberg, and Cheryl Crawford created The Group 
Theatre in New York City. The Group Theatre‘s central training methodologies were based on 
the teachings of Richard Boleslavsky and Maria Ouspenskaya, who defected to the United States 
in 1925 during an American tour with the Moscow Art Theatre to establish the American 
Laboratory Theatre. Boleslavsky and Ouspenskaya taught the American practitioners Emotion 
Memory, which Strasberg eventually began calling ‗Affective Memory‘
5
 and adapted the 
technique, which he taught through the mid-late 20
th
 Century in the New York City-based The 
Actors Studio. During a tape-recorded seminar at The Actors Studio in 1956, Strasberg said: 
The human being who acts is the human being who lives. That is a terrifying 
circumstance...The actor must constantly respond to stimuli that are imaginary. And yet 
this must happen not only just as it happens in life, but actually more fully and more 
                                                 
5
 Incidentally, Stanislavsky changed his phrasing of the technique from Affective Memory to Emotion Memory: 
―[W]e will call it Emotion Memory. Formerly, following Ribot [Théodule-Armand Ribot (1839-1916), French 
psychologist], we called it ―affective memory‖. That term has now been abandoned but has not been generally 
replaced by another. But we need a word of some kind to define it so we have agreed to call the memory of feelings, 
Emotion Memory‖ (197-198). 
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expressively. Although the actor can do things in life quite easily, when he has to do the 
same thing on the stage under fictitious conditions he has difficulty because he is not 
equipped as a human being merely to playact at imitating life. He must somehow believe 
(78).  
 
Using Affective Memory, Strasberg maintains that the actor must ‗lose‘ himself in the role: 
acting is living. The actor uses their own memories, based on sensations and imagery to conjure 
the appropriate emotional experience and apply it to the character. Once this process is reliably 
repeatable, the actor is able to perform their character ‗in the moment‘, and their performance 
should become un-self-conscious, instinct-driven, and pre-reflective. In this relationship between 
an actor and their character, the actor's actions can no more be understood without reference to 
the character than the character can be understood independently of the actor's actions which 
give the character its nature. In other words, the spectator cannot distinguish the lines between 
where the actor ends and the character begins. The psychophysical experiences of the actor and 
character are so thoroughly intertwined that they simply co-exist in oneness.  
 The Psychological Realism tradition, of which Strasberg‘s Affective Memory is a part 
and based on Stanislavski‘s Emotion Memory, is my illustration of radical intersubjectivity. This 
is not to say that at a certain point of developing a character, the actor is not reflective and 
conscious of the choices he or she is making, but rather an understanding that after much 
continued work on the character, the actor achieves a sense of pre-reflective engagement and 
immersion in the character. It is important to point out, however, that neither Stanislavski‘s early 
ideas around Emotion Memory nor Strasberg‘s Affective Memory are necessarily always 
effective tools for the actor to be ―in the grip of past feelings,‖ or to ―somehow believe,‖ to the 
extent in which they both aspire. No one acting technique or tool is ever undeniably effective in 
all circumstances for all actors. I am pointing to Emotion Memory and Affective Memory less 
for the sake of understanding their processes or the various degrees to which they are effective, 
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but more toward an understanding of their intended results: detailed truthfulness in acting; the 
actor experiences the emotion on behalf of their character as one experiences it in real life. 
 Although these intended results are not the only ‗other‘ to Brecht‘s aims in acting, I 
merely use them to illustrate what I mean by the actor performing in the radical mode. In fact, 
Brecht‘s and Stanislavski‘s (and later Strasberg‘s) approaches to the acting process are not at all 
diametrically opposed; moreover, they seem to share more intended results than not. Although 
Brecht makes it explicit that he does not want his actors losing themselves in their role in any 
way, this has more to do with his desire to expose the remarkable in the everyday, whereas 
Stanislavski‘s productions were concerned with the simplicity and accuracy of the everyday. 
Brecht‘s primary criticism of Stanislavski‘s pre-Russian Revolution naturalistic
6
 productions 
comes in The Messingkauf Dialogues when the Dramaturg says to the Philosopher, 
Action in [Stanislavski‘s] plays is reduced to a minimum, the whole time is devoted to 
depicting conditions; it‘s a matter of probing the inner life of individuals…What he cared 
about was naturalness, and as a result everything in his theatre seemed far too natural for 
anyone to pause and go into it thoroughly. You don‘t normally examine your own home 
or your own eating habits do you? (14-15) (original emphasis) 
 
Brecht is concerned that when a production – including the approach to the acting – is concerned 
with ―depicting the conditions,‖ the characters and their social circumstances are so engaged and 
embedded in the ‗naturalness‘ of the story that there is nothing to critically investigate. In other 
words, naturalism, via techniques like Stanislavsky‘s Emotion Memory and Strasberg‘s 
Affective Memory, produces an approach to acting that privileges the radical mode of 
                                                 
6
 Today, Stanislavski‘s pre-revolution productions are typically considered forms of realism, not naturalism; 
however, when Brecht was writing between 1939-1942, naturalism was the umbrella term commonly used to 
describe realistic productions. Nevertheless, Brecht‘s Dramaturg in The Messingkauf Dialogues does offer a 
distinction: ―Naturalism didn‘t last very long. It was felt to be too uneventful for the politicians and too boring for 
the artists, and it turned into Realism. Realism is less naturalistic than naturalism, though naturalism is considered 
fully as realistic as realism. Realism never gives absolutely exact images of reality; that‘s to say, it doesn't go in for 
full-length reproductions of dialogues such as one actually hears; it bothers less about being mistaken for real life. It 
does try to go deeper into reality, though‖ (16) (original emphasis).  
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intersubjectivity. The actor is so natural in their portrayal of their character that the spectator 
does not have the chance to ―pause and go into it thoroughly.‖  
 In the radical mode, actors do not take conscious stock of the literal, physical images of 
the goings-on in the world around them. Their perception of the images skips directly to meaning 
and, subsequently, actions and reactions. The character‘s world ―is neither contemplated nor 
observed. It is participated in‖ (Crossley 28). However, an actor must first contemplate and 
observe the facts and literal images (the lines of the letters on the page, to return to my earlier 
analogy) in order to put the pieces back together to form the character‘s whole world. Only after 
locating the source of the meaning of the images in the character‘s world can the actor let go of 
their reflective, conscious awareness and engage in a pre-reflective, radically intersubjective 
interplay with their character. I maintain that in order for the actor to also ―imply what he is not 
doing,‖ as Brecht insists, the actor must first be able to perform the character in the radical mode. 
The actor‘s embodied experience of their character gives way to the internal 
psychological experiences of the character. "We become aware of our own metal states,‖ 
Crossley writes in his dissection of Merleau-Ponty‘s position on intersubjectivity, ―in the same 
way that we become aware of others. Thus, our mental states are, in principle, always 
intersubjectively available by way of our performances" (34). I might turn this around and argue 
that the actor becomes aware of the character‘s mental states in the same way that he becomes 
aware of his own. For example, to ‗understand‘, Crossley suggests, following Wittgenstein
7
, is 
never a private, a priori affair. Understanding, as a conceptual construct, is part of a shared, 
public theoretical language, and ―must refer to publicly available performances‖ (35). Based on 
                                                 
7
 Crossley writes, ―A further argument for this, from Wittgenstein [1953], is that words such as ‗understanding‘ 
must refer to publicly available performances since they belong to a public language. Words in a public language 
can‘t apply to a private state according to this argument, because we could never have common rules of application 
for them‖ (35). 
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Crossley‘s reading of Merleau-Ponty, I suggest that anything actors can know about themselves, 
they learn in the same way they know that same thing about another: via observation of the 
others‘ public performances. The use of mirrors, video playback, or imitation exercises (two of 
which I describe in Chapter 2) can help the actor observe their ―publicly available performances‖ 
in order to become aware of their own mental states. For example, an actor might watch a video 
of herself performing her character, have an emotional reaction to a certain moment, and 
potentially learn something about the inner, mental state of the character. In this way, the actor 
gathers information and ideas about her character by observing the character‘s publicly available 
behavior as she watches her performance of the character on the screen.  
By interacting with others and perceiving the ways in which others react to its actions, the 
self becomes aware of its own mental states. Radical intersubjectivity is the pre-reflective 
perception of another‘s attitudes. When working with actors, however, it is important to become 
aware of one‘s typical process of observation and imitation because it points to the source of the 
pre-reflective development of the character‘s inner-states. Once the actor is reflectively aware of 
their character‘s public performances (gestures, movements, etc.), they can then begin to let go 
of that awareness and perform the character in a radical, pre-reflective mode. 
 
1.2. Building the Characters in The Galileo Experiment 
When I began rehearsals for The Galileo Experiment, I asked how the actor could 
imagine their character behaving in one attitude, but instead perform in another attitude. As I 
have argued above, the first half of this process requires that the actor build a character and play 
into the character until they can perform the character in a pre-reflective manner. In order for the 
actor to engage in a pre-reflective, intersubjective interplay with their character, they must 
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consciously break down the character‘s world into perceivable units. In other words, because the 
character cannot reflectively think about its physical experience, the actor must first make 
conscious choices and build a framework of the character‘s movement, gestures, and use of 
objects before they can let go and perform their character in the radical mode. It is important to 
acknowledge here that the actor is not the only agent in building a character. The playwright (if 
one exists), in our case, Brecht, obviously has a more than significant word in the development 
of a character. Given this, perhaps the process ought to be thought of as building an 
interpretation of a character. The production‘s director (if one exists), in our case, myself, also 
has a significant influence over the interpretation of the character. Finally, other actors (if they 
exist), five in our case, also have certain voices when it comes to individual interpretations of 
character. However, for the purposes of the rest of this thesis, I lump the agency of character 
development onto the particular actor who it is assumed will perform the character onstage. 
Before the actor can begin to successfully develop and build their character‘s physical 
bearing, they need to become consciously aware of their own personal movement and gestural 
habits. I called the overall combination of the actor‘s gait, bearing, and repertoire of gestures 
‗comportment‘, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a ―[p]ersonal bearing, carriage, 
demeanour, deportment; behaviour, outward conduct, course of action.‖ An individual‘s 
comportment is more than just their physical gait, but an outward, physicalized expression of 
their inner state. In other words, the word comportment is a concise label for a person‘s entire 
psychophysical process. However, this is not to say that an individual‘s comportment is always 
necessarily telling the truth about their inner experience. A person can easily perform an outward 
demeanor incongruent with their inner mental states in order to get something they want, to 
avoid a confrontation, or to achieve any other goal. This fact, however, only strengthens the 
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argument for developing character comportments because not only can the actor build a truth-
telling comportment for their character, they can also add elements of a ‗lying body‘ that the 
character adopts as a tactic to achieve certain ends. ‗Comportment‘ has its root the French 
comportement (behavior), and Brecht used the German noun Haltung (attitude). Making the 
actor conscious of their own comportment and why they move the way they do is an important 
first step because rather than assigning imagined meaning – as they will with their character – 
they are drawing upon their own real-life given circumstances to analyze their movement. This 
step gives the actor the tools with which they will build their character‘s comportment. I called 
this first rehearsal workshop ‗Becoming Aware of Comportment‘ (see appx. B)
 8
.  
First, I asked the actors to move around the rehearsal space and take an initial, general 
inventory of their bodies and the ways in which they moved. Next, I asked them to walk as if 
they were walking across our university campus or down a hallway at work, or wherever they 
currently spent most of their public life. As they walked, I asked them to take stock of the 
qualities of their movement: ―Notice your tempo, rhythms. Do you bounce, glide, march, float? 
Are you fast, slow, direct or indirect, sudden or sustained? Are you upright, or do you lean to one 
side, forward, or back? How do your limbs and gaze extend into the space‖ (see appx. B)? I 
asked them to identify just three elements of their comportment that they noticed (tempo, a 
leading body part, etc.) and to focus solely on those three qualities as they walked. Next, I asked 
them to exaggerate each of those three elements from a ‗1‘, their current level of exaggeration, 
gradually up to a ‗10‘, as heightened as physically possible. As they explored varying levels of 
exaggeration, I asked them to notice what it felt like physically and what emotional reactions 
they were having to these physical actions. They moved in an exaggerated manner for long 
                                                 
8
 This workshop is an adapted variation on a workshop Meg Mumford describes in her 2008 monograph Bertolt 
Brecht called ―Strutting Your Stuff‖ (143-145). 
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enough to become physically exerted. Finally, they settled at a ‗5‘ on the scale of exaggeration 
and I asked them to freeze and hold a tableaux. From here, two of the actors left the group and 
took up pencil and paper, along with the stage manager, to observe the remaining three actors. I 
assigned each of the new spectators an actor to observe and asked them to take notes about what 
they saw using Mumford‘s set of questions as starting points: 
1) What is the speed of movement? How much space does it take up? Is it expansive, 
strident, direct, and forceful, and/or meandering, indecisive, indirect? 2) Where and how 
are the eyes looking? Fixed and out on the horizon and/or downturned and constantly 
moving? 3) How does this body behave towards other bodies in the space? Is it open, 
closed, and/or ambivalent towards others? Is it playful and/or defensive, threateningly 
confident, and/or submissive, pliable (flexible), or provocative? (BB 144) 
 
As the spectators observed their actors, I asked the actors to consider the following: ―think about 
which aspects of your comportment have been informed, conditioned, shaped by social forces or 
roles: family, school, church, nation, urban/rural, ethnicity, class, work/study place, affiliation 
with social groups, gender, generation, or sexuality training‖ (see appx. B). Finally, the walkers 
and their spectators got together and discussed what they noticed.  
 There were many interesting discoveries including one spectator who noticed that his 
actor vigorously swung her arms tightly to her sides. The actor responded to her spectator‘s note 
by admitting that she was conscious of her weight. She articulated that perhaps her unconscious 
tendency was to walk quickly and swing her arms close to her sides in order to make herself 
appear more slender. In a journal entry based on the workshop, another actor wrote, ―[t]he 
exploration of my physicality strips layers from me and shoves me into a state of vulnerability. 
From this state, I am able to analyze myself more freely and mostly without attaching imagined 
meaning to my own perceptions of my physical self‖ (Hodgson 2012). This simple experience of 
looking at their own bodies and asking why they move the way they do seemed to help make 
room for the actor to build their character‘s comportment.  
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 Once the actors had the tools to consciously analyze and consider the psychological and 
social circumstances possibly responsible for their own personal comportment, they were 
equipped to make conscious, justified choices for their character‘s comportment. Building fully 
justified character comportments allows the actors to get into the character‘s skin, eventually let 
go, and perform the characters in the radical mode. Theoretically, with enough practice living in 
the character‘s comportment, an actor can forget comportment and perform in a pre-reflective 
manner, focusing on the character‘s objectives while continuing to be fully propelled by the 
character‘s social circumstances.  
 
Just as the actors had deconstructed their own comportment and articulated some of the 
reasons why they may carry themselves the way they do, in another workshop, I asked the actors 
to work the same way in reverse for their characters. Based on their characters‘ social 
circumstances, I challenged the actors to move around the space experimenting with making 
Fig. 3. G. Stephen Hodgson as Galileo 
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specific physical choices that seemed right for their characters. Each actor was working with a 
wide range of character traits and social circumstances: Galileo, a financially struggling scientist; 
Young Andrea Sarti (Hannah Appell), Galileo‘s landlady‘s son, a boy of about ten who Galileo 
schools in order to help pay his rent; Virginia, Galileo‘s daughter who, later in the play becomes 
a nun and spends her life taking care of Galileo under house arrest; Ludovico, a wealthy young 
man sent to study with Galileo because science is a popular conversation topic; and Federzoni, 
the poor, illiterate lens-grinder who assists Galileo with his experiments. All of these characters 
offered the actors multiple possibilities to comport their characters with a range of qualities that 
demonstrated their social class and circumstance. For example, in a note titled ―The new type of 
physicist,‖ reprinted under ‗Texts by Brecht‘ in the Willett/Manheim edition of Life of Galileo, 
Brecht himself describes his Galileo‘s physical qualities: 
My Galileo is a powerful physicist with a tummy on him, a face like Socrates, a 
vociferous, full-blooded man with a sense of humour, the new type of physicist, earthly, a 
great teacher. Favourite attitude: stomach thrust forward, both hands on the buttocks, 
head back, using one meaty hand all the time to gesticulate with, but with precision (119).  
 
Brecht makes it clear that his Galileo is a dramatized, fictional character rather than the ―pallid 
intellectualized idealist‖ of the history books (119). The fact that Brecht takes the time to 
describe in detail his vision for his Galileo is a testament to the importance he placed on the 
physical bearing of the character as a major element of the storytelling. In rehearsals, we 
explored a number of exercises to gather ideas for the characters‘ comportments. Throughout, 
the actors honed and crafted their character‘s comportment including their walking gait, repeated 
hand, arm, facial gestures, and the qualities of those gestures, and the specific ways in which 
they engaged with objects. After having specifically and consciously built the comportment of 
their character, each actor was now in dexterous control of two distinct comportments: their own 
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comportment as articulated and understood from the ‗Becoming Aware of Comportment‘ 
workshop, and their character‘s as developed throughout rehearsals. 
This image of two distinct beings sharing the same body harkens to a remark Brecht 
makes in The Messingkauf Dialogues. Brecht‘s Philosopher says, 
In future you actors can depict your characters so that one can imagine them behaving 
differently from the way they do…You can set about outlining your characters much as 
when a bolder and more experienced engineer comes along and corrects his predecessor's 
drawings by superimposing new lines on old ones…(53). 
 
An actor cannot completely extinguish his or her own personal comportment to make room for 
an entirely new psychophysical bearing. In Brecht‘s image, the actor/engineer makes changes – 
sometimes vast – to the original comportment, but the old lines remain, fixed upon the paper‘s 
memory like a line that cannot be completely erased. The old lines in juxtaposition with the new 
are another example of the actor‘s and the character‘s social circumstances and behaviors 
remaining exposed and interlacing throughout the performance. Even though the actor can never 
completely erase his or her own comportment, which is neither necessary nor ideal, if the 
character‘s comportment is as fully detailed and justified as the actor‘s, the actor can learn to 
perform the character in a pre-reflective mode.  
 In the radical mode of intersubjectivity, I argue that the actor/character dialectic is a 
phenomenologically interactional relationship that occurs prior to any cognitive distinctions 
between an actor and their character. In other words, in the radical mode, the performance is pre-
reflective, and the actor develops their character based on physical representations of the 
character‘s potential inner states. The performance is in a constant state of pre-reflective 
communion between the actor and their character. The actor uses his own memories and 
psychophysical experiences to build the character. Sometimes the spectator is witnessing more of 
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the actor, sometimes more of the character, but always a combination of both. This paradox is 
the subject of the following section. 
 
1.3. The Actor/Character Dialectic 
Considering the actor‘s process of becoming aware of their own comportment, and the 
subsequent development and construction of their character‘s comportment described in the 
previous section, I now explore the actor‘s relationship with their character given Brecht‘s 
explanation of the ‗not…but‘ procedure outlined in the introduction. Building on Merleau-
Ponty‘s description of the flesh as the fulcrum between subject and object, I play with the 
‗not…but‘ as an example of a pre-reflective, interactional relationship between an actor and their 
character. I argue that Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenology posited a pre-reflective, ongoing, 
interactional relationship between subject and object. Drawing on a chapter from Merleau-
Ponty‘s final, unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible, I illustrate my point that as a 
theoretical tool, phenomenology does not necessarily divide the subject and object, but rather 
argues that the body is the point at which subject and object converge and interact. Because the 
character is the actor‘s construct and because the actor and character share the same body, 
Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenology of the flesh functions as a useful way of looking at the inherent 
mutability of the actor/character relationship. In this section, my exploration of these two issues 
is twofold: on the one hand, it is an investigation of phenomenology as a process for 
interrogating the implications of Brecht‘s perhaps overly confident assertion that the ‗not…but‘ 
will lead to a Verfremdungseffekt in performance. On the other hand, I apply Crossley‘s 
definition of radical intersubjectivity to Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure. 
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I read the first step in Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure as a pre-reflective, interactional 
relationship between the actor and their character. The ‗not…but‘ requires a double-agency on 
the part of the actor. To reiterate Brecht‘s stance, the actor ―will at all essential points discover, 
specify, imply what he is not doing‖ (BT 137). On the one hand, the actor must perform the 
character in the radical, pre-reflective mode; meanwhile, on the other hand, the actor must find 
ways of allowing an alternative attitude to emerge. In this way, like Brecht‘s drawing analogy, 
some of the old lines emerge more clearly than the new and some of the new lines read more 
clearly than the old. The two sets of lines are not simply those of one character who changes its 
mind back and forth. Brecht is writing about the relationship between actors onstage with their 
characters. He writes, ―[w]hen reading his part the actor‘s attitude should be one of a man who is 
astounded and contradicts…The conduct of the man he is playing, as he experiences it, must be 
weighed up by him‖ (BT 137). Clearly, Brecht is arguing that the actor himself must do the 
weighing up of the man he is playing (i.e. the character). In his description of the ―fixing the 
‗not…but‘,‖ Brecht writes, ―[w]hatever he doesn‘t do must be contained and conserved in what 
he does…the character remains under observation and is tested.‖ In the analogy, the old lines 
represent what the character does not do and the new lines represent what the character does. 
Brecht himself would argue that this procedure of fixing the ‗not…but‘ is a conscious, 
reflective one on part of the actor because he must make the decision as to when and to what 
extent he should perform the character‘s inherent contradictions. When discussing the ‗reflective 
block‘ in the next chapter, I agree. Crossley suggests that Merleau-Ponty does not argue for an 
after-the-fact demonstration of what the subject does and what the object does; conversely, he 
calls for the simple acceptance that the world is merely available to the subject to be lived in, 
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reflectively or pre-reflectively. Similarly, I argue that the first established relationship between 
an actor and their character from the Brechtian position is open, pre-reflective, and fluid. 
Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenology imagined a pre-reflective, ongoing, interactional 
relationship between subject and object. Because Merleau-Ponty was writing in a time before 
many of the latest discoveries in the cognitive sciences, he was still using the dichotomy of 
‗subject‘ and ‗object‘ to clarify the distinctive perspective of the individual and their relationship 
with the world and other people. However, The Visible and the Invisible, written between 1959-
1961 and published in English in 1968, is a foreshadowing of many writings in the sciences and 
philosophy to come. In Engaging Audiences (2008), Bruce McConachie argues that semiotics 
and phenomenology have been made effectively irrelevant by recent theories of embodied 
cognition: 
Whether the actors are signs that correspond to something in the objective world or 
images that somehow relate to the subjective imagination of the perceiver, both semiotics 
and phenomenology divide the viewing experience between the subjects and the objects. 
In contrast, the [cognitive] science…posits an ongoing, interactional relationship that 
occurs prior to any cognitive distinctions between subjects and objects and that does not 
rely on signification…Put another way, the mind does not need to generate signs or 
holistic images and manipulate these complex representations to understand much of 
what the actor/characters do on the stage. If the mind/brain is mirroring their intentional 
motor actions (and coordinating inputs from sound and sight in the process), semiotic and 
phenomenological operations become largely superfluous for gaining information about 
the beliefs, emotions, and intentions of actor/characters (79). 
 
McConachie cites interactional simulation theory as proof that humans simply bypass the process 
of attaching symbolic meaning or phenomenological mental operations for gathering information 
about fictional characters or other stimuli. However, in Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-
Ponty takes the concept of self/other distinction to another level that seems to conflate the 
subject/object divide that McConachie asserts semiotics and phenomenology rely upon.  
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 Merleau-Ponty begins an early exploration of the concept of the body as sensible-
sentient: a body that both feels and is felt. As an illustration, Merleau-Ponty used the analogy of 
one person‘s hands touching in which he argues for the double-agency of the body as both 
sensible and sentient: 
My body, it was said, is recognized by its power to give me ‗double sensations‘: when I 
touch my right hand with my left, my right hand, as an object, has the strange property of 
being able to feel too. […] When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two 
sensations felt together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an 
ambiguous set-up in which both hands can alternate the roles of ‗touching‘ and ‗being 
touched‘ (106). 
 
To adapt this concept, the actor‘s body, too, is sensible-sentient – by feeling his own body, the 
actor is feeling the character. To be clear, the character is not doing any of the feeling and does 
not have the same autonomous agency as the ‗other‘ to which Merleau-Ponty refers elsewhere in 
his writing. The character cannot do any literal, physical feeling because it is a conceptual 
construct of the actor; further, however, the actor is sensible-sentient because his own feelings 
form the entire basis for the character‘s feelings, therefore, the actor feels the character while he 
is also being felt by himself (much like Merleau-Ponty‘s hands). 
Merleau-Ponty scholar Thomas Baldwin makes it clear that, although it was not yet a 
fully developed idea in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty was pointing to the flesh 
as the point at which subject and object are no longer distinct. In an introduction to the final, 
unfinished chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, ―The Intertwining – The Chiasm,‖ Baldwin 
argues that ―the relationship is reversible: the hand that touches can be felt as touched, and vice-
versa, though never both at the same time, and it is this 'reversibility' that [Merleau-Ponty] picks 
out as the essence of flesh. It shows us the ambiguous status of our bodies as both subject and 
object‖ (248). In other words, the flesh of the actor‘s body upon which the audience fixes its 
gaze is in fact a kind of ‗vanishing point‘ – the actor/character dialectic is the ambiguous status 
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of the actor‘s body as both actor and character.  
Merleau-Ponty takes this idea much further in ―The Intertwining – The Chiasm.‖ 
Borrowing the image of the Greek letter x (chi), Merleau-Ponty developed a new concept of the 
body that he called the ‗chiasm‘ or the crossing-over and combination of subjective experience 
and objective existence. The flesh (much like the interactional simulation process McConachie 
cites), Merleau-Ponty argues, provides access to both perspectives. He argues that our experience 
is both that of the touching subject and as the tangible object. Along with interactional 
simulation, McConachie cites embodied realism – a concept which argues that we are joined to 
the world via our direct embodied interactions with it and that we do not need to consciously 
make meaning through symbols or analysis to understand it (McConachie 80). However, as I will 
show, Merleau-Ponty came to the same conclusion about our experience with the world and with 
others over forty years before cognitive philosophers began trying to oust phenomenology as a 
relevant analytical tool.  
The body is lost outside of the world and its goals, fascinated by the unique occupation of 
floating in Being with another life, of making itself the outside of its inside and the inside 
of its outside. And henceforth movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the other 
and to themselves, return toward their source and, in the patient and silent labor of desire, 
begin the paradox of expression (144) (my emphasis). 
 
As I suggested in the introduction, this ―paradox of expression‖ is a useful way of 
discussing Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure. Since the actor‘s body is inhabited by and under the 
influence of two sets of social circumstances, when performing ―with a definite gest of showing‖ 
(BT 136), there is necessarily a continuous conversation between what the actor is doing, what 
the character is not doing, what the actor is not doing, and what the character is doing. 
Remember the metaphor of the engineer‘s drawing: at certain points the old set of lines seem to 
emerge as the bolder of the two. To perform in two opposing attitudes back and forth, from the 
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perspective of the character to an alternative perspective of the character, as imagined by the 
actor, and back again, would seem to create a paradox, not a diametrical or contradictory 
paradox, but as Merleau-Ponty suggests, a paradox that takes as its point of departure the flesh of 
the same body. In this way, the actor and their character co-exist in oneness with each other and 
their real and imagined worlds. "[F]or the first time,‖ Merleau-Ponty writes, ―I appear to myself 
completely turned inside out before my own eyes‖ (143). Although he is talking more generally 
about one‘s own body in engagement with another separate body, I am adapting Merleau-Ponty‘s 
concept of a body revealing itself to itself via the observation of another body‘s observation of 
that original body. The case of Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure is similar: in one instance, the 
character's attitude is absent and the actor's present, whereas in another instance the opposite is 
the case. Another way of imagining it might be that an actor/character braid (or chiasm) is drawn 
before our view and as one disappears beneath, the other arises from below. ―For the first time,‖ 
Merleau-Ponty continues, ―the body…clasps another body, applying itself to it carefully with its 
whole extension, forming tirelessly with its hands the strange statue which in its turn gives 
everything it receives (144). This communion between bodies coming together to form a 
―strange statue,‖ I argue, is what Brecht is effectively requiring the actor to create with the 
technique of the ‗not…but‘ procedure. He asks the actor to share a body with a character and to 
be able to show when the audience is to hear from the character or from himself. The relationship 
that is developed by the joint actor/character being is inherently corporeal because in order to 
show either side of the coin, the coin itself must be physically turned over just as the actor must 
physically turn himself over from the character‘s body and into his own or into another 
comportment in order to show both perspectives. Although the character cannot be released from 
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its containment within the perceived illusion, it maintains only one half of the relationship the 
spectator witnesses onstage.  
In my appropriation of Merleau-Ponty‘s discussion of the subject and the object, I argue 
that the character and actor are interlaced. The link between actor and character is the body – the 
reversibility of the flesh. Merleau-Ponty suggests that each body is conjoined by a mutual 
epidermal map: "[t]here is double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the 
tangible in the visible; the two maps are complete and yet they do not merge into one" (134). Just 
as the actor sees, the character is perceived; as the character sees, the actor is perceived. Their 
‗perceivability‘ and perceptions of one another are interwoven and overlain amongst and upon 
one another, yet they never merge into a single comportment.  
If we read closely, Merleau-Ponty is doing precisely what McConachie argues only 
cognitive science can do. Merleau-Ponty conflates the subject/object split into an understanding 
that we are coupled with the world and others through our direct embodied interactions with 
them, rather than through symbolic readings or subconscious mental operations. The world and 
others are simply available for us to be with and live in. Likewise, in my reading of the 
‗not…but‘ procedure, the actor is coupled together with his character through his embodied 
performance of the character and performs the character in the pre-reflective, radical mode. The 
process of stepping out of the pre-reflective, radical mode in order to ―discover, specify, imply 
what he is not doing‖ (BT 137) is the subject of the next and final chapter of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2. Performing the „Reflective Block‟ 
In a return to my thesis – that the actor can successfully perform Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ 
procedure by performing in both the radical and egological modes of intersubjectivity – this 
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chapter analyzes Nick Crossley‘s discussion of egological intersubjectivity in terms of the actor‘s 
process and relationship with character. In an effort to further illustrate the use of this theoretical 
lens, I describe our process in The Galileo Experiment where the actors chose moments in the 
text to exit their characters‘ comportments and perform in an alternative attitude, ―with a definite 
gest of showing,‖ in order that the audience might notice their comment on their character. 
Although it may seem as if I am merely switching from analyzing the character as a subject 
united with the actor, to analyzing the character as an object distinct from the subject of the 
character, I am not. I am attempting to distinguish two modes of the actor‘s perception and 
experience of their character and to argue that one is more immediate than the other. By breaking 
away from the radical mode in which the actor‘s perception of their character is eventually pre-
reflective, and considering an egological mode in which the actor‘s perception of their character 
is conscious and reflective, I am not arguing for a division of actor into subject and character into 
object. Rather, I maintain that phenomenological intersubjectivity – be it through either the 
radical or egological mode – is an ongoing, fluid process of uniting subject and object, actor and 
character. In this chapter, I argue that the moment of switching over from the radical to the 
egological mode (performing the ‗reflective block‘) is the very act of ―fixing the ‗not…but‘‖ that 
Brecht describes.  
 
2.1. Egological Intersubjectivity 
 Rather than engaging in a pre-reflective, ongoing interactional relationship with their 
character as in the radical mode of intersubjectivity, the actor also has the option to rely on their 
imagination to theoretically put them in the shoes of their character. In this way, the actor is not 
inextricably bound to the character simply because they share a body. From this perspective, 
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rather, the actor can go through the same process as described in the previous chapter, but 
maintain a poised readiness to detach themselves from their character and perform the final step 
in Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure. In Crossley‘s terms, this is egological intersubjectivity. In this 
section, I adapt Crossley‘s terminology and make the argument that the actor can foreground the 
reflective aspects of the egological mode in order to ―discover, specify, imply what he is not 
doing‖ (Brecht, BT 137). ―Through imagination,‖ Crossley writes, ―we are able to detach 
ourselves, in part, from the world of shared perceptions and thus to (partially) escape the 
intersubjective world‖ (47). Although he qualifies this use of imagination as a partial detachment 
because it is impossible to remove oneself from the world‘s phenomena, Crossley is suggesting 
that by imagining ourselves in the shoes of another (even a fictional character), we can put 
ourselves in their position via a series of mental operations, which is called embodied simulation 
theory
9
 in cognitive science (see Gallese and Wojciehowski 2011). In other words, we are not 
bound to the world and others just because we have a body whose senses mediate one hundred 
percent of our experience. There is indeed a private space – an egological space, which is 
theoretical, not real – in which the self can create and maintain an intellectual distance from the 
world and others. 
It is important to be clear that in the egological modality, unlike the radical, the self 
consciously experiences itself as a distinct self that is experienced by others. As I alluded in the 
previous chapter, this reflective understanding of self as distinct from others is possible in the 
radical mode, but only to the extent that neither mode is ever fully extinguished; therefore, there 
is always the potential for distanced reflection in the radical mode and pre-reflective immersion 
in the egological. The conscious action that allows the self to experience others is simply, to 
                                                 
9
 Gallese and Wojciehowski write, ―Embodied simulation is conceived of as a basic functional mechanism of our 
brain, enabling not only a direct bodily access to the actions, emotions and sensations of others, but also the 
possibility to imagine similar self- and other-related contents‖ (14). 
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reiterate Crossley‘s definition, an ―imaginative transposition of self into the position of the other" 
(23).  
Another difference between this mode and the radical mode might be to say that in the 
radical mode, the self feels the other and their mutual world; while, in the egological mode, the 
self seeks to understand the other in order to know how to engage with them in their world. 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates this point by describing a number of observations regarding imitation 
in early childhood. He argues that when young children imitate adults, they are imitating the 
results of the actions or gestures the adult is performing rather than the action or gesture itself
10
. 
He cites an observation where a child is able to hold a hairbrush to his head and brush his own 
hair, but is later unable to imitate the gesture of lifting his hand to his head without a brush 
(Merleau-Ponty 1979). He writes, ―[the child] is still unreceptive to the nonconcrete and aimless 
gesture‖ (35). In the acquisition of skills, the child is performing an egological moment – a 
transposition of themselves into the experience of the adult in order to gain an understanding of 
his own perceptual experience of the world. For Crossley, this phenomenon is significant for two 
reasons. First, it means ―the child is oriented to and responds to the meaning (qua purpose) to the 
gesture as a whole, rather than to the empirical extension of the adult‘s body through space.‖ The 
child imitates the gesture in a quest to understand why the adult performs the gesture and is 
therefore oriented to the meaning of the action. Second, it ―makes a strong case for the notion of 
a lived sense of corporeal equivalence between body-subjects. It suggests an innate 
intercorporeality‖ (52).  This intercorporeality is a useful way of thinking about the ways in 
                                                 
10
 In 1996, neuroscientists at the University of Parma, Italy discovered what is now called the Mirror Neuron System 
(MNS) (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996). The same neurons that fire in the brain of the performer of an 
action also fire in the brain of the observer of the performed action. Mirror neurons suggest that some primates, 
including humans, are goal and result-oriented learners – which is to say that humans skip the mechanics and go 
straight to asking why actions are performed. Without the use of the fMRI machine, Merleau-Ponty made this 
observation decades before the Parma discoveries. 
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which humans step back and take stock of their surroundings in order to make logical sense of 
the world. 
In the egological mode, the actor is not so much feeling the character as they are viewing 
and thinking about them from various perspectives in order to understand the possibilities for 
how and why they do what they do. The actor consciously constructs not only the mental concept 
of their character, but embodies their character‘s experience in an innate intercorporeal 
relationship. In the radical mode, the actor is in a deep, immersive, pre-reflective engagement 
with their character, but when in the egological mode, the actor is stepping away for another 
vantage point. I will offer specific examples of what this might look like in the next section. 
From the egological perspective, we reduce the other to the consciousness that we have of them. 
Consciousness, therefore, is the subject of perception as opposed to basic bodily existence as it is 
for Merleau-Ponty. In the third chapter of Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming,  
―Imagination, Self and Other: On Egological Intersubjectivity,‖ Crossley argues that the other, in 
the egological modality, is experienced as 1) a psychophysical object, 2) a subject who 
experiences and knows us, and 3) an intersubject who sees the world as we do. Notice here that 
in the egological mode of intersubjectivity, the other is given the same qualities and abilities as 
the self, but there is not yet any talk of a recursive feedback loop between the two subjects. If I 
have a body that senses, you must have a body that senses. If I can see you, you must be able to 
see me. If I see the grass as green, you must also see green grass. This is different from the 
radical mode because it is a conscious acknowledgement of the other as different from the self, 
which, in return means that the self is an individually perceiving self. My imagination allows me 
to draw these conclusions because I imagine myself as you in order to know you as separate 
from me. This imaginative transposition is the beginning of the feedback loop alluded to above. 
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By recognizing the other as distinct from myself, I therefore recognize that I too am distinct from 
them. This theoretical awareness of self as distinct from other comes later in the child‘s 
development than the radical mode, with which they are born (Crossley 50). 
From the egological aspect, the self‘s relationship with the other is less immediate than 
the radical approach. In fact the whole dichotomy of self and other is a conscious, theoretical 
concept. McConachie‘s criticisms of phenomenology as dividing ―the viewing experience 
between subjects and objects,‖ would be more convincing if targeted at an analytical process like 
deconstruction or some postmodernist positions because of their conscious dismantling of 
phenomena for theoretical investigation. Therefore, to be in the egological mode is to be in an 
analytical mode in which one is aware of their own deconstruction and division of subjects and 
objects. ―[S]elf and other are objects of our experience,‖ Crossley writes, ―and the more 
reflective and reflexive aspects of our being more generally‖ (49). In order to understand the 
other, the relationship is mediated by the self‘s anticipations and self-conscious performance of 
the attitude of the other. The self perceives the other as different and, using empathy and 
simulation, tries to imagine what it is like to be that person by adopting and performing in the 
attitude of the other. Once this initial step is experienced, the self can step back and look at the 
other in a new light. In other words, after thoroughly developing the character, the actor is able to 
experience their character as a psychophysical object: a conceptual ‗other‘ in need of being 
consciously interpreted, analyzed, and adjusted. This reoriented perception of the other by the 
self is what Husserl called the epoché, or ‗bracketing‘.  
‗Bracketing‘ is a cognitive operation in which one theoretically removes consciousness 
from belief in the real world in order to objectively analyze the conditions of a given set of 
experiences. The actor, as all artists, has the gift of the epoché: the ability to put brackets around 
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the impressions surrounding them and look merely at the things as they are in and of themselves. 
The actor has the opportunity to put the character into perceptual brackets in order to freely 
analyze the character apart from its given circumstances. The difference between the egological 
and radical modes in this context is that when stepping back from the character in the egological 
mode, the actor does not put the pieces back together into a seamless picture of reality. Rather, 
the actor critiques the character by stepping out of the character to look at it from a new 
perspective. However, as it will become clear in the final section of this chapter, I argue that this 
is only actually possible to a certain extent. The process of stepping out of the character and 
performing the final step of Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure is the subject of the next section. 
 
2.2. Performing the „not…but‟ Procedure in The Galileo Experiment  
In this section, I detail our experience of exploring how the actor successfully performs 
Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure, a major constituent element of the Verfremdungseffekt in acting. I 
conclude that some performance techniques succeeded in creating a sense of the possibility for 
an alternative attitude to emerge out of the actor‘s performance, and that others ought to be 
reserved as rehearsal studio exercises. In the following three sub-sections, I take clues from 
Brecht‘s essays and Mumford‘s workshops to explore how certain techniques can bring the actor 
closer to the experience of performing the ‗not…but‘ procedure. 
 
2.2.1. Finding the contradictions 
In order to successfully perform the ‗not…but‘ procedure, the actor must first choose 
moments in the text where their character behaves in a strange, surprising, remarkable, or  
contradictory manner. When designing our rehearsal process, I took clues from Brecht: 
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Before memorizing the words [the actor] must memorize what he felt astounded at and 
where he felt impelled to contradict…The actor should refrain from living himself into 
the part prematurely in any way, and should go on functioning as long as possible as a 
reader…Given this absence of total transformation in the acting there are three aids 
which may help to alienate the actions and remarks of the characters being portrayed: 1. 
Transposition into the third person. 2. Transposition into the past. 3. Speaking the stage 
directions aloud. (BT 137-8). 
 
By choosing specific moments to step back from the character and make their commentary 
visible, the actor is not under pressure to impulsively maneuver between the radical and 
egological modes. Rather, they have identified specific moments in the play‘s text that are 
appropriate signposts for the actor to abandon their pre-reflective immersion in their character 
and reflect on their character‘s behavior. However, in the final section of this chapter I explore 
the problematic logic of thinking about the radical and egological modes as separate modes of 
perception. 
With these moments of strangeness or contradiction in mind, I asked the actors to 'freeze' 
a scene by raising a hand and narrating their character's behavior or attitude in the third-person as 
if in a novel. ―Speaking the stage directions out loud in the third person,‖ Brecht continues, 
―results in a clash between the two tones of voice, alienating the second of them, the text proper‖ 
(BT 138). In this exercise, the actor is automatically distanced from their character (and, 
subsequently, the text itself) simply by shifting into the third-person singular and in the past 
tense. The actors became narrators for their characters‘ actions and behaviors. Without much 
specificity, I simply asked the actors ―after you speak, if you sense a ‗remarkable‘ or 
‗contradictory‘ moment in the text, raise your hand, break character, and describe the quality of 
the character‘s action‖ (Ambrose 2012). For example, the actor playing Andrea raised his hand at 
one point in Section 4 following one of his own lines and said, ―…he said patronizingly‖ 
(Swibold 2012). I encouraged them to keep the scene moving as quickly as possible despite these 
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interruptions which helped to give the actors a sense of dexterity when it came to flexing 
between the radical and the egological modes. The exercise also allowed the actors to 
impulsively re-discover and announce their previously found moments of contradiction. These 
moments of strange, contradictory behavior varied. For example, actor Katie Norcross wrote of 
her character: 
Virginia is a mess of contradictions. It‘s this weird twofold relationship where she wants 
to both explode at her father and hug him at the same time. These feelings lead to 
contradictions that manifest physically. She has moments that are both docile and strong 
willed. One second she‘s being a ―good daughter‖ and the next she‘s standing up to 
Galileo and challenging him (Norcross 2012). 
 
Norcross captured this moment of contradictory behavior by stifling Virginia‘s impulse to 
explode at Galileo, and embraced him instead. It was a moment fraught with tension because 
although she wants to ―explode at her father,‖ as the audience might expect her to do, she hugs 
him instead. Norcross had to consciously discover this moment in the text, explore it in 
rehearsals, and then allow it to live as a stifled instinct within the character.  
In another striking example in Section 4 (the penultimate scene in Willett‘s translation), 
Norcross again stifled an impulse to react to Galileo. Sitting across from one another at the table, 
Virginia is untangling a large knot of yarn. Galileo (Hodgson) stops eating and picks up a piece 
of paper from his manuscript, dips his pen in the inkpot, and begins making changes to the 
manuscript. At this point in the play, Virginia is living with Galileo under house arrest by the 
Inquisition. Galileo is not allowed to work on his manuscript. He is also nearly blind at this point 
in the play and he severely strains his eyes to read the paper. As Hodgson picked up the pen, 
Norcross stopped untangling the yarn, looked up at him, took a breath as if to say something, 
held her breath and merely watched him work, finally exhaled, looked back at her yarn and 
continued untangling. Brecht does not write that Virginia scolds Galileo for straining his eyes 
 43 
and doing forbidden work. The spectator would expect Virginia to make a comment and try to 
stop him, but she knows it is useless so she contradicts her impulse and goes about her 
painstaking task of untangling the knot of yarn (see appx. C, Video 3). 
Upon discovering these moments of contradictory behavior, the actors were able to pick 
and choose a number of instances within the scene's action and text to make a deliberate physical 
shift away from the comportment of the character and into their own (figs. 4-6 and appx. C, 
Video 4, 00:07-00:13, 00:19-00:26, and 00:28-00:45). Rather than literally narrate their 
character‘s feelings or intentions in the third person, they spoke the text as Brecht wrote it, but 
maintained the distanced perspective of the narration from before. They performed the lines as  
 
themselves and with the feelings they had for the character in that moment of action.  
In a sense, it became a diegetic commentary on their character's behavior not via 
narrative language, but via physical performance. In another particularly effective example from 
scene one, Hodgson found a moment of Galileo‘s behavior that he had found remarkable because 
it happened to strike a chord with him personally. The Curator (Bickley), is trying to convince 
Fig. 4. Actor Katie Norcross in 
the character's comportment. 
Fig. 5. Norcross shifts into her 
own comportment. 
Fig. 6. Norcross shifts back into 
the character's comportment 
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Galileo to develop something useful for the city, but Galileo wants money for his astronomical 
research: 
 
CURATOR: We realize you are a great man. A great, but dissatisfied man, if I may say 
so. 
GALILEO: You‘re right, I am dissatisfied. I‘m forty-six years old and I‘ve achieved 
nothing that satisfies me. 
CURATOR: I won‘t disturb you any longer (see appx. A, Section 1). 
 
Up until this point in the play, Galileo is all arrogance and bravado. His contradictory statement 
is striking because it is the last thing we expect him to say to the Curator. When Hodgson spoke 
the line ―You‘re right, I am dissatisfied. I‘m forty-six years old and I‘ve achieved nothing that 
satisfies me,‖ he dropped Galileo‘s comportment entirely, sat back in his chair, and with a sigh, 
recited the line in a distanced manner that made one think that Hodgson himself was speaking 
the line as it applied to his own life. It was a moment of distanced reflection and simultaneous 
heartache because it was real not only for the character but also for the actor (see appx. C, Video 
4, 00:28-00:45). This kind of narration from outside the physical comportment of the character 
gave way to the sense of the ―outward expression‖ for which Brecht argues. Brecht argued, 
however, that the attitude of showing must be an ongoing feature of the actor‘s performance, not 
just certain moments here and there.  
 The actor has the opportunity to assert their own human agency by making certain 
choices that show their character behaving in a contradictory manner. Mumford describes a 
moment in one of Brecht‘s rehearsals where the actor was reluctant to do something he thought 
his character would not do: 
Brecht was less concerned with how something should look than with contradictions and 
the reason for why something was 'not so, but so'. Thus he suggested to the actor playing 
the farmer [in The Caucasian Chalk Circle] that, when Grusha was struggling to take her 
pack off, he should lend a helping hand. The actor was concerned that this sudden change 
in behaviour from a mistrustful [attitude] to a willing helpfulness could not be justified. 
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Brecht retorted: 'Why should he have only one side? Incidentally, people dispense 
kindness when it costs them nothing' (SG 65). 
 
This kind of contradictory behavior – whether written into a script or made as a spontaneous 
choice in rehearsal – allows the actor to really show their double-agency. For example, just 
because the character of Galileo is generally cocky, overly confident, and arrogant does not mean 
that he cannot have moments of extreme vulnerability before other characters he outwardly 
deems inferior to himself.  
 
2.2.2. „Show that you show!‟ 
 Until that point in rehearsals, we had only experimented with specific moments where the 
actor clearly shifted from the character‘s comportment to the actor‘s comportment, and back 
again. Even when immersed in the character, however, the actor must continue to show what is 
going on inside the character. Brecht writes, 
Everything to do with the emotions must be externalized; that is to say, it must be 
developed into a gesture. The actor has to find a sensibly perceptible outward expression 
for his character's emotions, preferably some action that gives away what is going on 
inside him (BT 139). 
 
Brecht seems to be saying that the qualities of the actor‘s movement and gestures must not be 
empty, that they must be pulsing with the character‘s inner emotional driving force. It also seems 
to me that the gestures need to be specific to the character as chosen by the actor. By that I mean 
that the gestures the character performs belong to the actor in some self-conscious way. It should 
be as if the spectator is watching the actor make the gesture, which is an expression of the 
character‘s inner life. Brecht is known for telling actors to ―[s]how that you show!‖ Mumford 
argues that according to this principle, ―[t]he…actor must clearly demonstrate that s/he is a 
performer and one who critically represents the behaviour of an historical character and/or who 
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critically narrates historical events‖ (SG 24). In rehearsal, the actor is performing gestures and 
movements in the moment as they emerge from the character; while in performance, the actor 
clearly demonstrates in a reflective, egological manner that they are showing the character rather 
than intuitively channeling the character‘s inner drives. In order to further investigate this 
concept, I adapted a workshop for the actors to explore showing their gestures using imitation.  
We found that one way the actor can self-consciously perform the gestures of the 
character while giving away what is going on inside the character was by imitating other actors‘ 
imitations of their own physicality. Brecht writes, ―[o]nce the idea of total transformation is 
abandoned the actor speaks his part not as if he were improvising it himself but like a quotation‖ 
(BT 138). The concept of the actor quoting or relaying their character‘s emotions and intentions 
was useful because the actor, in this case, is discovering gestures piece by piece in rehearsals, 
and then using those gestures to meticulously and self-consciously quote the character‘s inner 
emotional experience via their external expression. I developed the exercise loosely based on 
another of Mumford‘s workshops
11
.  
First, I took video of Galileo and young Andrea playing the first part of Section 1. When 
they had finished, we connected the camera to a projector on a large screen and watched the 
scene. As they watched the video without the audio, I asked them to pay very close attention to 
the movement qualities of the other actor in the scene. Focusing on just thirty seconds or so of 
the scene, the actors imitated the exact qualities of the other actor‘s performed comportment. 
Then they performed the scene again, but cross-cast. Again, we took video of the cross-cast 
section of the scene and either actor analyzed the other actor trying to imitate their performance 
of their character‘s comportment. Mumford writes, ―cross-casting can assist performers to 
                                                 
11
 Specifically, ―Exercise 1: cross-cast interview: creating V-effects‖ (BB 147). 
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develop a questioning attitude toward the familiar‖ (BB 149). Hodgson noted some specific ideas 
that he got from the cross-casting exercise:  
10.30.12: There are several things that I can take from today‘s work: a hunching over the 
food with elbows on the table from Hannah, knife gestures from Colton, and an 
abruptness of physicality from Hugh. Also from Hugh: My walk stiffened and specified. 
Right leg barely bends (2012). 
 
The actors were not analyzing their own performance of their character‘s comportment, but 
another person‘s perception of that performance. I had the actors switch back to their original 
roles and imitate, as accurately as possible, the other actor‘s imitation of their comportment. 
Having explored this exercise in various fashions many times in other contexts as well, when the 
person doing the imitating performs the other‘s comportment, they always slightly exaggerate 
the qualities they notice most. By pointing up those specific gestures and qualities of a 
character‘s comportment, something happens when the original actor reclaims that gesture or 
quality and it seems as if they are performing it with the possibility of an alternative action ready 
to be suggested. This is the final step in performing Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure (see appx. C, 
Video 1).  Taking a final hint from Brecht, we adopted one more technique for ―fixing the 
‗not…but.‘‖  
 
2.2.3. Using objects to leave the comportment 
I asked the actors to bring a personal object from their everyday life to rehearsal that had 
significance in the actor's life and that was small enough to fit in a pocket (these ranged from a 
small stone, a lucky pen, to a keychain). When they approached the moments in the scene that 
they had deemed strange, surprising, remarkable, or contradictory – and in which they had 
previously frozen the scene to narrate – they were asked to simply remove the object from their 
pocket and imagine it as a point of connection with their own lives. When they took hold of their 
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object, I asked them to physically release themselves from the comportment of their character 
and return to their own. Although they still spoke the lines, they 'left' the comportment and world 
of their character for a brief moment and showed the other half. They switched from the 
perceived to the perceiver in order to offer the audience a glimpse into what they, the actor, 
thought was important about this character in this moment and to take note of it. After the 
moment had passed, they reentered the character‘s comportment and continued the scene (figs. 
4-6). Brecht used a similar process with English actor Charles Laughton who helped translate a 
later version of the play and first played Galileo for the American premiers in Los Angeles in 
August of 1947 and New York in December that same year. Both avid cigar smokers, Brecht 
writes about Laughton‘s work in his 1948 manifesto A Short Organum for the Theatre: "[w]e 
find a gesture that expresses one-half of his attitude – that of showing – if we make him smoke a 
cigar and then imagine him laying it down now and again in order to show us some further 
characteristic attitude of the figure in the play" (BT 194). Galileo does not smoke, but Laughton 
does. The actor holds the object while 'showing' a different, unexpected perspective, and lies it 
down in order to perform the character's expected behaviors and attitudes. 
 The essence of the personal object (Laughton's cigar or an actor's keychain) has the 
power to become a critical and emotional link between actor and character. Perhaps the moment 
of contact between the hand and the object is the phenomenological fulcrum that mediates the 
shift between the comportments of actor and character. Perhaps the object, in its interaction with 
the flesh, which the actor and character share, is the fulcrum between the radical and egological 
modes. The actor playing Virginia wrote,  
Why do I hold the object at those particular moments? I just grabbed my object any time 
that I felt like I was interacting with my Dad and any of those feelings came up. Instead 
of me commenting on the scene by grabbing my object, it was almost the opposite. It was 
as if whenever I thought or felt the scene commented or reflected on my life, that was 
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when I grabbed my object (Norcross 2012). 
 
It is curious to think that a personal object can pull the actor from a pre-reflective immersion in 
their character and out into their own, or a different experience and comportment. Although the 
practice of stepping out of the character‘s comportment in moments when the character‘s 
behavior has been deemed contradictory was a useful illustration of my original research 
question, in performance, these moments were not noticeable enough for the spectator to clearly 
―go into it thoroughly.‖ Perhaps fully stepping out of the character‘s comportment is a useful 
rehearsal technique, but not something to carry into performance. The cross-casting imitation and 
third-person narration exercises, however, and the actors‘ attempts to find an external expression 
of ―what is going on inside them‖ seemed to bring a continuous sense of the ‗not…but‘ – it was a 
feeling of tension, as if something surprising or unexpected might happen at any moment. 
Perhaps stepping out of the character‘s comportment and using personal objects to aid in the 
psychology of doing so are only useful as rehearsal exercises. In any case, the actors became 
agile enough to navigate the transitions from within their character, into themselves or a 
different, unexpected attitude, and back again. This experience gets at the heart of my thesis that 
the actor can successfully perform Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure by performing in both the 
radical and egological intersubjective modes. The synthesis in the dialectic of these two modes is 
the subject of the final section of this chapter. 
 
2.3. Crossley‟s „reflective block‟ and Brecht‟s „not…but‟ 
I want to take the opportunity at this point to remember that for this thesis I am primarily 
concerned with the phenomenological experience of performing Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure. 
The many reasons for and meanings behind why Brecht believed that an actor should show two 
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or more sides of a character have already been explored in the other studies and analyses, some 
of which I reviewed in the introduction. In this section, rather, I want to compare the ‗not…but‘ 
procedure to what Crossley calls a ‗reflective block‘ in intersubjective relations. I make this 
comparison in steps in order to make the argument that performing the ‗not…but‘ procedure is 
not necessarily a clear-cut process of merely switching back and forth from one mode of 
phenomenological intersubjectivity to another. First, I take this dialectical synthesis of two 
modes of the intersubjective understanding between an actor and their character and consider 
what it means to perform with both a reflective awareness of the character‘s actions as well as 
with a pre-reflective, intuitive responsiveness to the character working through the actor. Next, I 
explore the actor‘s experience of performing in both the radical and egological modes. Finally, I 
consider the possibility that the actor cannot completely remove themselves from their character 
in order to make a comment on their character‘s contradictory behavior. Rather, perhaps I ought 
to embrace Merleau-Ponty‘s (and Johnson & Lakoff 1999; Damasio 2000; Johnson 2008; 
Edleman 2005) suggestion that the subject/object divide is far less dichotomous than the 
theorizing mind seems to want it to be. Perhaps the ―two sides‖ of the character Brecht calls for 
may be more of a double helix rather than a coin. 
Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure is akin to the process of what Crossley calls the ‗reflective 
block‘, where all pre-reflective experiences of another are suddenly brought to the forefront of 
reflective consciousness. Crossley describes the swing between the two modes: 
Sometimes we are deeply engrossed with others, too engaged to be aware of either 
ourselves or of them. At other times, and rapidly, we can become sharply aware of both, 
constituting them as reflective and reflexive aspects of experience. All spontaneous 
actions can be stultified by a reflective block, only to be undermined later by a genuine 
and spontaneous communication which collapses the reflective barrier of self and other 
(71) (emphasis mine). 
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In terms of performance, the ‗reflective block‘ is the moment in which an actor suddenly and 
intentionally becomes astutely aware of their work on the character. At points, actors should 
allow themselves to be in deep, pre-reflective engagement in their characters‘ experience and 
given circumstances. However, when considering the Verfremdungseffekt, it is the actor‘s job not 
only to portray the character, but also to portray the character as if they are a historical figure in a 
documentary report. This sense of reporting as if the actor himself is not the character – 
removing the illusion of the actor as character – is the moment when the actor becomes sharply 
aware of both the radical mode of immersion in the character and the egological mode of taking 
a reflective step away from the character. In effect, the ‗reflective block‘ that stultifies the actor‘s 
fluid, spontaneous co-existence with their character is the alternative attitude for which Brecht 
calls when performing the ‗not…but‘ procedure. To be clear, this does not necessarily mean that 
when the actor steps back to perform in the reflective, egological mode, that the radical mode is 
not a continually present element of the encounter. 
 I think this swinging back and forth between radical and egological intersubjectivity that 
Crossley describes perhaps reads as an exaggeration of what really happens. Merleau-Ponty 
makes this argument in ―The Intertwining – The Chiasm,‖ as do contemporary cognitive 
scientists and philosophers (for a lengthy and convincing study of the dual nature of human 
consciousness, see Edleman 2005). I also think that the stark shifts between the actor‘s and their 
character‘s comportments that the actors in The Galileo Experiment made were perhaps an 
exaggeration of what Brecht was calling for in his description of the ‗not…but‘ procedure. ―It 
should be added,‖ Crossley writes, ―that the egological attitude always necessarily entails the 
radical attitude as an underlying function‖ (71). The radical, pre-reflective mode of experiencing 
the world and others is a given. It is an a priori state of being. The egological, reflective mode 
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merely pops up once and a while to remind us that we are here and we are self-conscious beings 
with the awareness of that fact. However, it is rare that our metacognitive faculties suddenly 
come to life and make us reflect on our ontological state. Alternatively, the actor – once able to 
perform their character with deep, pre-reflective engagement – is able to determine when the 
reflective mode is going to emerge and generate an alternative attitude to their character‘s 
perspective. 
 The actor cannot completely leave the character‘s bodily experience, as I had assumed in 
our rehearsal process, and still be performing the possibility of an alternative to their character‘s 
actions. As Crossley continues, ―[w]henever we are reflectively aware of the other we are still, 
always, necessarily responsive to their moves at an unreflective level. We are always affected by 
what they do and say, by their movements and gestures.‖ (71). The actor has to remain in some 
kind of ‗touch‘ with their character in order to perform an alternative action or possibility. 
Neither the ‗reflective block‘ nor the ‗not…but‘ procedure are a complete a stepping out of 
character to make commentary on behalf of the actor. Rather, the actor must consciously choose 
to do something the spectator would not expect the character to do. The actor‘s agency to show 
their process of showing their character performing in an unexpected manner is the ‗reflective 
block‘. When the actor chooses to allow their character to perform in a manner more consistent 
with the spectator‘s expectations of the character, the block is undermined.   
  
Conclusion: The Intertwining Nature of the „not…but‟ Procedure 
I created The Galileo Experiment because I wanted to know what kind of toolkit the 
‗Brechtian‘ actor needs in order to perform the ‗not…but‘ procedure. I had assumed that the 
actor would need to create a definite split between themselves and their character in order to 
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show the spectator their social criticisms of the character while performing onstage. I found that 
not only was Brecht asking for something much more complex and dynamic, but that the actors 
in The Galileo Experiment discovered various, fascinating ways of pointing to their characters‘ 
behavior while performing them onstage. I began this research with a question: how does the 
actor perform in one attitude while simultaneously performing with the potential for an 
alternative attitude to emerge? I began the theoretical investigation of this question by 
constructing a dialectical framework of two seemingly opposing modes of phenomenological 
intersubjectivity – radical and egological – as defined by Crossley. I want to conclude this thesis, 
however, with a return to Merleau-Ponty and offer a more holistic, interactional, fluid, ongoing 
transference of reflective awareness and pre-reflective engagement. I reiterate my argument that 
performing Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure is not a stark switching back and forth between radical 
and egological intersubjectivity, but a leaning to one side in order show an alternative attitude of 
the character. Perhaps Brecht‘s theoretical understanding of human presence and perception was 
not complex enough. Perhaps there are more than two sides of a character‘s potential for 
contradictory or remarkable behavior. Perhaps there are many ways of ―fixing the ‗not…but‘.‖ 
 In ―The Intertwining—The Chiasm,‖ Merleau-Ponty conceptualizes the human body‘s 
relationship with itself and others in two primary ways. He argues that the body can, on the one 
hand, be a sensible object – one that actively senses itself and others. On the other hand, 
however, the body can be passively sentient, or phenomenal – a body that is sensed by itself and 
others. Remembering the example I examined in Chapter 1 from Phenomenology of Perception, 
in ―The Intertwining – The Chiasm,‖ Merleau-Ponty describes the ways in which his right hand 
can perform the touching of another object, while his left hand simultaneously touches his right 
hand. In this way, he argues, the right hand is both touched and doing the touching – it is a 
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sensible-sentient, or a sensing phenomenon. However, this twofold experience, he argues in his 
final work, cannot share the stage so to speak – that is, the experience of touching and being 
touched cannot be experienced with an equal intensity simultaneously: 
If these experiences never exactly overlap, if they slip away at the very moment they are 
about to rejoin, if there is always a ―shift,‖ a ―spread,‖ between them, this is precisely 
because my two hands are part of the same body, because it moves itself in the world, 
because I hear myself both from within and from without. I experience – and as often as I 
wish – the transition and the metamorphosis of the one experience into the other (148). 
 
If I forge this understanding of the human body‘s experience of itself and others into a lens 
through which to examine Brecht‘s ‗not…but‘ procedure, I argue that the ‗reflective block‘ is the 
actor performing ―the transition and metamorphosis‖ from sentient actor being sensed by the 
spectator, to the sensible actor touching and commenting on the character. 
 Merleau-Ponty‘s procedure of performing both the overlapping sensible and the sentient 
aspects of experience suggests that they are neither mutually exclusive nor one and the same. 
They are, in fact, reliant upon one another. In order to sense its own body, that same body must 
be sentient and in order to be sentient, that body must be sensed. In much the same way, in order 
to perform the ‗not…but‘ procedure, the actor must break away from the radical mode in which 
the actor‘s perception of their character is pre-reflective, and consciously sense the character, 
which lest we forget shares a body with and was conceived, at least in part, by the actor. This 
theoretical examination of both the sensible-sentient that Merleau-Ponty describes and the 
‗not…but‘ procedure does not necessarily divide the actor into a sensing subject and the 
character into an objective, sentient phenomenon. The relationship is an ongoing, fluid process 
uniting actor and character as a sensible-sentient being that is merely highlighting contradictory 
aspects of its shared sets of behaviors. Brecht‘s Verfremdungseffekt – particularly the ‗not...but‘ 
procedure – requires the actor to become well aware of the intertwining dual nature of human 
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perception and presence. To ―contain and conserve‖ what he does not do in what he does, the 
actor is performing in both the radical and egological modes of intersubjectivity. 
The ‗reflective block‘ is a brief Verfremdungseffekt. It is not necessarily a complete 
removal from character, but a choice to twist the character around to see what is on the other 
side, then twisting it back again to further explore the more familiar. ―Egological 
intersubjectivity,‖ Crossley concludes, ―is only a relative reflective distancing. It is never 
absolute.‖ (71). As in our conscious lives when we have moments of reflection or moments 
where we question our choices based on the perceptions of our experiences, so the actor has the 
agency to choose when to consciously show a character‘s opposite possibilities. Echoing Schall, 
Mumford argues that ―fixing the ‗not…but‘,‖ is a procedure Brecht explored in order to ―create 
each character as an unstable unity of opposites…to show that humans are ever-changing 
entities, constantly shaped by and contributing to the flux of their physical and social 
environments‖ (BB 116). Developing and performing a character with an amalgamation of 
potential opposing behaviors requires the actor to be armed with an arsenal of techniques for 
discovering their character‘s various impulses. In The Galileo Experiment, we explored a handful 
of these techniques in order to discern what worked and what did not. Ultimately, as I deduced in 
section 2.2, the cross-cast imitation and third-person narration seemed to bring the actors closest 
to creating characters infused with ―an unstable unity of opposites.‖ Some of these techniques 
were most effective as rehearsal techniques for discovering possibilities, but the most effective 
performance techniques were those where the actor remained in the character‘s comportment, 
stifled the impulse to do what the character wants to do, and instead made a contradicting choice. 
Choosing which action to allow the character to play into in a given moment of the text, and then 
contradicting that action and showing their conscious choice to do something else is the 
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phenomenological experience of performing in both the radical and egological modes of 
intersubjectivity. It is ―fixing the ‗not…but‘.‖ It is the ―paradox of expression.‖ 
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Appendices 
 
A. The Galileo Experiment Performance Script 
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B. ‗Becoming Aware of Comportment‘ Workshop 
 
October 23, 2012: Becoming Aware of Comportment 
 
Warm-up: 6:00 – 6:15: Suryanamaskar 
 
Train: 6:10 – 6:30: Guided breathing meditation: the point between breaths {Zarrilli} 
 
Workshop: 6:30 – 7:30: Strutting your Stuff (to be done with 10 or more people) 
{Mumford} 
- Walk the room as you walk on campus.  
- Notice your tempo, rhythms. 
- Do you bounce, glide, march, float? 
- Are you fast, slow, direct or indirect, sudden or sustained? 
- Are you upright, or do you lean to one side; forward or back? 
- How do your limbs and gaze extend into the space? 
- If you are at a 1 now, exaggerate the features of your walk to a 2, 3, 4-10 etc. Freeze! 
- Half of the group leaves and become observers. 
- Remaining participants continue at a 4 or 5. Spectators choose someone and take note 
of their movement features. 
 
 On whiteboard: ―Comportment: a social bearing or physical relation and attitude to time, 
space, and other people.‖  
 
- Walkers, think about which aspects of your gait/posture have been 
informed/conditioned/shaped by social forces/roles: family, school, church, nation, 
urban/rural, ethnicity, class, work/study place, affiliation with social groups, gender, 
generation, or sexuality training. 
- Spectators, analyze your chosen walker‘s comportment. Jot down some notes in 
response to these questions (handed out on separate sheet with writing space): 
1. What is the speed of movement? How much space does it take up? Is it 
expansive, strident, direct, and forceful, and/or meandering, indecisive, 
indirect? 
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2. Where and how are the eyes looking? Fixed and out on the horizon and/or 
downturned and constantly moving? 
3. How does this body behave towards other bodies in the space? Is it open, 
closed, and/or ambivalent towards others? Is it playful and/or defensive, 
threateningly confident, and/or submissive, pliable (flexible), or provocative? 
- Walkers, stop. Spectators go to your walkers and discuss with them what you noticed. 
Modify the walk together and select two or three elements that reflect their 
comportment and exaggerate them to a 7. Begin walking again. Freeze! View/record 
the tableau. 
- Discussion (no more than 10 min.) 
 
BREAK 
 
Rehearse: 7:40 – 8:50: Working on comportment in the scene. 
- Set space for French Scene #1 between Galileo and Young Andrea (Steve and 
Hannah) 
- Move through scene reading from scripts – improvise movement but thinking about 
your body‘s relationship to the space, where your eyes go, and (based on previous 
exercise) what elements of your comportment are exaggerated. 
- Without discussing, do the same scene again, but observing the other body‘s 
relationship to the space, where their eyes go, and what elements of their 
comportment are exaggerated. 
- Discuss for 5 min. sharing what you noticed about each other.  
- Run through again exaggerating two elements of the comportment that you just 
discussed. 
- Time providing, work through scene again in following ways: 
- Actors are without scripts, but two others stand behind each of them and read them 
audibly into their ears while the actors focus on showing their comportment and 
fulfilling their objectives physically. 
- As if in a boxing match. No scripts, just their improvised, paraphrased version of the 
scene.  
1. First actually hopping around, throwing punches with lines; then moving 
through established movements of the scene ―as if‖ boxing, but only vocally 
and with suggestive gesture. 
Cool-down: 8:50 – 9:00 
- Discuss for 5 min. 
- Everyone journals quietly on comportment for remaining time. 
 
C. Videos: 
1. https://youtu.be/NqqUKdVwMsg 
2. https://youtu.be/wqD53BGpMc8 
3. https://youtu.be/0GPZWPB_XS0YouTube 
4. https://youtu.be/wA_1WdgZ5Lg 
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D. Section 1 Piano Score by Emily Larson
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